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ABSTRACT 
  
Objective: Anosognosia for motor impairment is a complex syndrome that can manifest itself 
under different forms, guiding patients’ behaviour and task decisions. However, current 
diagnostic tools tend to evaluate only more explicit aspects of anosognosia (asking the patients 
about their motor abilities) and fail to address more subtle features of awareness. We have 
developed a new assessment measure, the ECT (Errand Choice Test), where patients are asked 
to judge task difficulty rather than estimate their own impairment. Method: We assessed 
awareness in a group of 73 unilateral left- and right-brain damaged (30 LBD and 43 RBD, 
respectively) patients by means of the VATAm, which explicitly requires them to evaluate their 
own motor abilities, and the ECT. A control group of 65 healthy volunteers was asked to 
perform the ECT under two conditions: Current condition (i.e. using both hands) and Simulated 
conditions (i.e. simulating hemiplegia). Results: 27% of the patients showed different 
performance on the VATAm and ECT, 21% of the patients showing lack of awareness only on 
VATAm and 6% only on ECT. Moreover, despite the ECT identified a higher frequency of 
anosognosia after RBD (33.3%) than LBD (27.6%), this hemispheric asymmetry was not 
significant. Remarkably, anosognosic patients performed very similarly to controls in the 
‘current condition’, suggesting that anosognosic patients’ ability to perceive the complexity of 
each task per se is not altered. Conclusion: Different methods may be able to tackle different 
aspects of awareness and the ECT proved to be able to detect less evident forms of awareness.  
 
Keywords: anosognosia, unawareness, hemiplegia, assessment, brain damage, implicit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Anosognosia for hemiplegia is usually assessed asking the patients about their motor abilities 
(Marková & Berrios, 2014). Patients may be asked to respond to structured interviews 
investigating their ability to move their limbs (Jenkinson, Preston, & Ellis, 2011; Nurmi & 
Jehkonen, 2014 - see also Table 1) or to rate their motor performances in everyday tasks (e.g., 
Marcel, Tegnér, & Nimmo-Smith, 2004; Della Sala, Cocchini, Beschin, & Cameron, 2009, 
Prigatano, 2014 - see also Table 1). Invariably, these evaluations imply some degree of 
metacognition: patients are asked to estimate their own motor skills and, in some cases, they 
are asked to comment on their previous performance and use of strategies (Moro, Scandola, 
Bulgarelli, Avesani, & Fotopoulou, 2015). However, there is evidence to suggest that lack of 
explicit awareness may be associated to some degree of insight (e.g., Marcel et al., 2004; House 
& Houdges, 1988; Nardone, Ward, Fotopoulou, & Turnbull, 2007; Cocchini, Beschin, 
Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2010; Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, & Kopelman, 2010; 
Prigatano, 2014; D’Imperio, Bulgarelli, Bertognoli, Avesani, & Moro, 2017). Patients may 
verbally deny their motor deficits yet abstain from activities requiring the use of both hands 
(Bisiach & Geminiani, 1991) or adopt successful strategies in approaching bi-manual tasks 
using one hand (Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro, Pernigo, Zapparoli, Cordioli, & Aglioti, 2011; 
Garbarini, Piedimonte, Dotta, Pia & Berti, 2013) or refrain to perform potentially dangerous 
activities for hemiplegic patients (D’Imperio et al., 2017). In contrast, Ramachandran (1995) 
reported on anosognosic patients who consistently chose bi-manual rather than uni-manual 
tasks concluding that they did not show a ‘tacit knowledge’ of their paralysis.   
Brain damaged patients can suffer from different degrees of motor deficits, and those with 
moderate or mild motor impairment may also show anosognosia. However, in order to 
accurately interpret “responses to specific questions, such as - Can you move your hand? – 
[…], the criterion of complete paralysis [is] necessary” (Nathanson, Bergman, & Gordon, 1952, 
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p. 381). This leads to the exclusion from the assessment of patients showing moderate and mild 
forms of motor impairment. Furthermore, the exclusion from assessment of several left-brain 
damaged patients may be due to associated language difficulties. Therefore, the assessment of 
anosognosia for right and left-brain damaged patients not showing severe hemiplegia ought to 
rely on different methods enabling the examiner to reliably interpret the patients’ responses 
according to their degree of motor impairment.  
 
Inspired by a previous study by Ramachandran (1995), this study aims at devising a novel 
method to investigate less explicit aspects of anosognosia by asking patients to judge the 
difficulty of several motor tasks, rather than estimate their own motor disability. This 
instrument, labelled Errand Choice Task, allowed us to assess patients with different degrees 
of motor impairment as well as left-brain damaged patients showing with language deficits. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
 
METHOD AND MATERIALS 
Participants 
A total of 138 participants were recruited for this study. None had any previous history of 
psychiatric disorders. The study was completed in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration 
and all participants gave informed consent.  
 
Patient group 
A group of 73 (33 women) brain damaged patients recruited in the Brain Injury Rehabilitation 
Unit, Somma Lombardo Hospital (Italy) entered the study1. Their demographic and clinical 
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data are detailed in Table 2. They all suffered from a first stroke; 30 had unilateral left 
hemisphere damage (LBD) and 43 had unilateral right hemisphere damage (RBD). Clinical 
neuroimaging (CT/MRI scans) showed that most patients (n=56) had a lesion encompassing, 
or limited to, the frontal and parietal lobes. Compared to RBD, the LBD patients had on average 
a longer onset-assessment interval; this difference fell short of significance (t-crit=1.882; 
p=.064). 
 
To be considered for the experiment, patients had to present with clear contralesional motor 
impairment in their upper limb, as assessed by means of the Motricity Index (Wade, 1992). 
During this assessment, the patient sat on a chair or a wheelchair; three left/right upper limb 
movements were assessed: “pinch grip”, “elbow flexion” and “shoulder abduction”. For each 
of these movements, a score from 0 (no movement) to 33 (normal power) is given. The score 
for upper limb movements is then calculated by adding the score for the three movements plus 
1, to give a total score between 1 (severe motor impairment) and 100 (no motor impairment). 
Poor performance due to apraxia, tremor or ataxia is not considered as evidence of paresis. As 
reported in Table 2, the scores indicate that the patients presented with various degrees of motor 
impairment, with 43 out of 73 patients showing complete paresis  in  their upper limb 
Patients’ independence in performing daily tasks (such as mobility, bathing, dressing) was 
evaluated by means of an ADL scale (Activity of Daily Life; Katz, Ford, Moskowitz, Jackon, 
& Jaffe, 1963; Mahoney & Barthel, 1965) where lower scores indicate lower degrees of 
independence. As reported in Table 2, the patients obtained on average a score of 8.5 out of 20, 
indicating an important decline of everyday independence. A series of t-test analyses was 
conducted to compare demographical (age, education level) and clinical (onset from lesion, 
motor impairment for upper limb and ADL score) variables between LBD and RBD. No 
significant differences were found. 
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--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
 
 Patients were also assessed with a comprehensive neuropsychological battery. 
Extrapersonal neglect was assessed by means of two cancellation tasks (Line cancellation -
Albert, 1973 and Star cancellation - Wilson, Cockburn, & Halligan, 1987) and by means of a 
Line Bisection Test (Wilson et al., 1987). Personal neglect was assessed by means of the Fluff 
Test (Cocchini, Beschin, & Jehkonen, 2001), the Comb/Razor Test (Beschin & Robertson, 
1997) and the One Item Test (Bisiach, Perani, Vallar, & Berti, 1986). Reasoning abilities were 
assessed by means of the Vertical version of the Raven Progressive Matrices (Gainotti, 
D’Erme, Villa, & Caltagirone, 1986; norms in Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987). Non-verbal short-
term memory was measured with the Corsi Blocks test (Spinnler & Tognoni, 1987). Table 3 
reports percentage of patients showing pathological performance on these tests. 
 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
 
Control group 
A group of 65 (42 women) right-handed, healthy volunteers entered the study to refine the 
items and the scoring system of the Errand Choice Test (see below). Their mean age was 44.4 
(sd= 21.0; range= 17-82) and they had a mean of 11.7 years of formal education (sd= 4.7; 
range= 3-20). Controls’ age was significantly lower than LBD (t-crit= 4.5; p< .01) and RBD 
(t-crit=4.9; p< .01), whereas education level was not significantly different between controls 
and both patient groups. 
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Assessment Procedures 
Anosognosia assessment 
Visual-Analogue Test for Anosognosia for Motor Impairment (VATAm). 
To assess evidence of anosognosia for upper limb motor deficits, all brain damaged patients 
underwent the VATAm (Della Sala et al., 2009). In this test, patients are requested to rate (from 
0= no problem to 3= severe problem), one at a time, their ability to perform a series of simple 
everyday motor tasks, such as clapping their hands. For the purpose of this study only the sub-
scale for the upper limb, which consists of 8 bi-manual tasks, was considered (score range: 0-
24). There were also 4 check questions, for which the expected ratings lay at one or the other 
extreme of the scale. Performance on the check questions was not added to the score, as they 
were used solely to ensure the participants’ compliance and reliability. The patients’ self-
evaluation was compared with the ratings of their caregivers who filled in the questionnaire 
evaluating the patient’s motor skills. The resulting score, i.e. the caregiver-patient discrepancy 
value, obtained by subtracting the patient’s self-rating of the 8 bi-manual tasks from those given 
to the patient by their caregivers, could be checked against available norms (Della Sala et al., 
2009). This score indicates the patient’s degree of awareness/unawareness for their upper limb 
motor impairment. In the VATAm, the possible discrepancy value for upper limb items ranges 
from -24 (negative values indicate patient’s overestimation of their motor deficit compared to 
the caregiver’s judgment) to +24 (positive values indicate patient’s underestimation of their 
motor deficit compared to the caregiver’s judgment, i.e. unawareness of their own deficits). 
According to the norms set in Della Sala et al. (2009), values falling between 3.8 and 8.0, 8.1 
and 16.0 or 16.1 and 24.0 were taken to indicate mild, moderate or severe anosognosia, 
respectively.  
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Errand Choice Test (ECT) 
A novel task was devised for the purpose of this study: The Errand Choice Test. To assess the 
perception of one’s own motor skills and its implication on task choice, participants were 
presented with a list of 18 pairs of everyday tasks. Each pair consisted of one task usually 
performed with one hand (uni-manual task – e.g., ‘Comb your hair’) and one task usually 
performed with both hands (bi-manual task – e.g., ‘Fold a sheet in half’). Each task was 
illustrated by a drawing to clarify the type of performance requested and to emphasise whether 
the tasks required the use of either only one or both upper limbs (see Figure 1a for an example). 
For each pair, participants had to decide which task they would find it easier to perform in their 
current condition.  
 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Material and procedure for this test were refined by means of three pilot studies with small 
groups of healthy volunteers and brain damaged patients (not included in the final sample 
groups). The three phases of the pilot studies allowed us to i) (phase 1) classify each task as 
either uni-manual (i.e., a task usually performed with one hand) or bi-manual (i.e., a task 
usually performed using two hands); ii) (phase 2) create unambiguous illustrations of each task 
to facilitate comprehension, minimize memory load and underline the use of one or two hands; 
and iii) (phase 3) select the tasks less sensitive to age or gender.  
In the final version of the Errand Choice Test, drawings for each pair of tasks were presented 
on an A4 sheet on the ipsi-lesional side of the testing desk, the question they depicted was also 
read aloud by the experimenter while pointing to the corresponding drawing. Sixteen pairs 
(each consisting of one uni-manual and one bi-manual task) constituted the experimental trials. 
In half of the trials the uni-manual task was presented first and to the left side of the A4. Two 
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check items were also used. Based on pilot data, in each pair of the check items, one of two 
tasks was clearly much easier to be performed than the other one (i.e. ‘Drink from a glass’ – 
easy task; ‘Rip a bush with roots’ – difficult task) even with no motor impairment (see Figure 
1b for examples). If participants did not provide the expected response on these check 
questions, their data were excluded from further analyses.  
The eighteen pairs (16 experimental trials and 2 check pairs) were presented in a fixed 
pseudo-random order with the two check questions as first and last items (core actions for each 
pair are listed in Table 4). For each item in the pairs, participants were invited to evaluate the 
difficulty of the tasks and then indicate which of the two tasks they would consider easier to 
perform in their current situation (Current condition). There was no time limit for responses 
and questions could be repeated if required. The scoring system is detailed in the Result section. 
To assess the reliability of the Errand Choice Test, 28 patients were asked to perform it 
again on Current condition between 1 and 3 days later.  
Brain damaged patients performed the VATAm and ECT in random order.  
 
In addition, the controls were presented a second time with the same pair of tasks but, on 
this occasion, they were asked to re-evaluate the task difficulty indicating which task they 
would consider easier to perform should they not be able to move one of their arms (Simulated 
condition).  
 
Statistical analyses.  
As in in previous studies (e.g., Cocchini et al., 2009), a t-test for single cases by Crawford 
and Garthwaite (2007) was used to established cut-off scores of the new ECT. ANOVA and 
t-test analyses for independent groups have been used to compare hemispheric differences 
and different awareness degrees. In case of multiple comparisons, we adopted Bonferroni 
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correction. Finally, non-parametric Spearman correlations have been run to analyze reliability 
of ECT and its relationship with others variables. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
VATAm (upper limb sub-scale) 
Fourteen out of 30 LBD patients (46.6%) showed evidence of severe (7 cases), moderate (5 
cases) or mild (2 cases) explicit anosognosia. Twenty-one out of the 43 RBD patients (48.8%) 
showed evidence of severe (8 cases), moderate (7 cases) or mild (6 cases) explicit anosognosia. 
Averaged discrepancy scores for aware and unaware LBD and RBD patients are shown in 
Table 5. The differences between aware and unaware LBD and RBD patients were not reliable 
(t-crit= -1.169; p=ns; t-crit= .635; p=ns, respectively).  
 
Errand Choice Test 
Controls 
One healthy volunteer was excluded as he interrupted the test. Therefore, analyses were carried 
out on 64 healthy volunteers’ responses and their performance on the two conditions. Table 4 
illustrates the scores on Current and Simulated conditions. Scores in both conditions poorly 
correlated with age (r=.066; p=.602 and r= -.134; p = .291, current and simulated condition, 
respectively). In all pairs, uni-manual choices increased under Simulated condition. The 
difference between the two conditions represented the “awareness” factor. In other words, the 
proportion of controls who identified the uni-manual task as easier only when they simulated 
hemiplegia represented the ‘pure’ impact of being aware of not being able to move one arm. 
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This difference (i.e., Simulated minus Current) for each pair of items was then considered to 
assign a weighted score for each choice and develop a weighted scoring system (See Table 4). 
In order to establish a cut-off value and interpret each individual patients’ performance, 
controls’ performance during the Simulated condition was then recalculated assigning the 
related weighted score of each pair when the uni-manual task was chosen. The overall weighted 
score could range from 0 (if no uni-manual task was chosen) to 405 (if all uni-manual tasks 
were chosen). On average, healthy volunteers under Simulated condition obtained a weighted 
score of 389.25 (sd= 29.35; range= 289-405). 
Crawford & Garthwaite’s (2007) t-test was used to establish the lowest value (weighted 
score) below which performance should be considered abnormal. An overall weighted score 
lower than 318 (out of 405) was significant with p< .01 and it was then set as cut-off point to 
interpret the patients’ performance.  
 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
 
Patients 
One LBD patient (case  57) and one RBD patient (case  20) were excluded from further 
analyses as they failed at least one check question. Therefore, further analyses were run on a 
sample of 29 LBD and 42 RBD patients. Each patient was assigned a weighted score every 
time the unimanual task was chosen as easier. For example, had a patient chosen as easier tasks 
‘Fingers through hairs’ in the first pair, ‘Prune a small plant’ in the fourth pair and ‘Pick up a 
card’ in the last pair, this patient’s ECT score would have been 64 (i.e. 25 + 25 + 14; See Table 
4 for weighted scores for each pair). Looking at individual scores, 22 patients (8 - 27.6% LBD 
patients, and 14 - 33.3% RBD patients) performed below cut-off on the Errand Choice Test 
showing evidence of lack of awareness in estimating task difficulty given their motor 
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impairment (see Figures 2 and 3). Six of the 8 anosognosic LBD patients and 7 of the 14 
anosognosic RBD patients had complete paresis. Errand Choice Test scores for aware and 
unaware LBD and RBD patients are shown in Table 5. The overall difference between LBD 
and RBD patients’ scores was not significant (t-crit= .693; p=ns). Considering aware and 
unaware patients separately, the ECT differences between LBD and RBD patients were also 
not significant (t-crit= -1.507; p=ns; t-crit= -.865; p=ns., for aware and unaware patients, 
respectively).  
The 28 (10 LBD and 18 RBD) patients who performed the Errand Choice Test twice 
obtained an average score of 307.79 (sd=111.53) on first testing and an average re-test score 
of 298.54 (sd=122.02). The difference was not significant (t_crit= .965; p= ns). A Spearman 
correlation run between the test and the re-test scores indicated a high positive correlation (r= 
.91; p< .001). 
 
--- Insert Table 5 and Figures 2 & 3 about here --- 
 
Finally, we calculated a weighted score on Current condition (i.e., when they were free to 
think that they could use both hands) for each of the 64 controls, following the same scoring 
procedure used with the patients. We then compared the performance of the Controls with those 
the 49 aware patients and the 22 anosognosic patients. Not surprisingly, patients aware of their 
motor deficit scored very high (mean= 387.1; sd= 22.8) on the Errand Choice Test, indicating 
that they considered the uni-manual tasks easier than the bi-manual tasks. Anosognosic patients 
and controls obtained similar scores (anosognosic patients’ mean= 235.8; sd= 63.9; controls’ 
mean= 241.0; sd= 64.01), indicating that anosognosic patients’ rating was led by the incorrect 
assumption they could use both hands. A 2 (LBD, RBD) x 2 (aware, unaware) ANOVA showed 
a significant effect of awareness (F (1,67 = 217.02; p < .001) but no other interactions. Two 
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further t-test analyses between controls and both aware and unaware patients showed a 
significant difference only between controls and aware patients (t-crit= 15.22; p <. 001). 
 
Comparing performance Errand Choice Test and VATAm 
Two patients were excluded from the Errand Choice Test analyses (see above). Therefore, 
results from 71 patients (29 LBD and 42 RBD) on the VATAm and Errand Choice Test were 
compared. As shown in Table 6, 37 (52.1%) patients showed evidence of unawareness on at 
least one test, 25.3% of them showed lack of awareness on both tests, and VATAm identified 
15% more patients as anosognosics than the Errand Choice Test.  
A non-parametric Spearman correlation run with all 71 patients between Errand Choice 
Test scores and VATAm discrepancy scores resulted in a negative significant correlation        
(r= -.48; p< .001), indicating that those patients who were less aware on the VATAm were also 
less aware on difficulty of bimanual tasks.  
 
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
 
DISCUSSION 
Often, the behaviour of patients is not consistent with their explicit acknowledgement/denial 
of their motor deficit (e.g., Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998; Cocchini et al., 2010; Moro et 
al., 2011). Some studies have shown that patients may indirectly acknowledge hemiplegia 
when it is attributed to another person (e.g., Marcel et al., 2004). It follows that anosognosia 
for one’s own motor deficits manifests at different degrees of awareness (e.g., Marcel et al., 
2004; see Heilman, 2014 for a recent review) and methods to assess anosognosia should reflect 
such complexity (Jenkinson et al., 2011). By means of a newly devised test (the Errand Choice 
Test), we investigated less evident aspects of awareness for different degrees of severity of 
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motor impairment in a sample of 73 brain damaged patients who were asked to judge task 
complexity rather than focus on their own deficit.  On this test, they had to identify which of 
the two possible motor tasks (one uni-manual and one bi-manual) would be easier to perform 
in their current condition. Poor comprehension or general poor compliance were addressed 
using check items whereby participants were asked to identify the easiest task between two 
uni-manual tasks of clearly different difficulty. Our sample showed a relatively low exclusion 
rate as only two participants did not provide the expected responses and their results had to be 
excluded from the analyses.  
The Errand Choice Test proved to be reliable showing a very high test re-test correlation, 
suggesting that the task is relatively sheltered by fluctuations of possible confounding 
variables, such as attentional disorders, perseveration, general lack of compliance and practice 
effect. Moreover, despite reduced risky decision-making has been associated with ageing (e.g., 
Di Rosa et al., 2017), the ECT performance seems unrelated by age. This may be due to the 
low complexity of the decision task required in this test, which is therefore suitable for different 
ages.  
A sample of 65 healthy volunteers performed the test under two different conditions. Data 
collected under ‘Current’ (i.e. being able to use both upper limbs) and ‘Simulated’ (i.e., 
pretending to be unable to use one arm) conditions allowed us to identify the actual impact of 
awareness for possible motor impairment on each item. Comparison of data from these two 
conditions enabled us to establish whether the choice of uni-manual task mainly depends on 
general perception of ease or on awareness that one arm could not be moved (Simulated 
condition). For example, in the Current condition 53% of the controls considered the uni-
manual task “Scratching your nose” easier than the bi-manual task “Clapping your hands”. 
However, in the Simulated condition the choice of the uni-manual task rose to 98%, suggesting 
that the increased percentage (i.e., from 53% to 98%) of uni-manual choices was mainly driven 
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by the “awareness” of not being able to move one arm. This information was then implemented 
to develop a weighted scoring system to interpret clinical data in terms of normal/pathological 
performance. To minimize the risk of false positives, we calculated a conservative cut-off (i.e., 
318 with p< .01; which corresponds to a value nearly 3 standard deviations from the norms’ 
mean). Considering this cut-off, we identified a sizeable group of 31% (i.e., 22/71) brain 
damaged patients showing distorted perception of task difficulty. These patients may engage 
in motor activities without adopting correct strategies to compensate for their motor 
impairment, increasing their chance to employ risky behaviours. It should be noted that 9 out 
of 22 anosognosic patients did not have complete hemiplegia of their upper limb. As suggested 
by Nathanson et al. (1952), also non-paretic patients may show considerable lack of awareness 
for their motor deficits and these may have passed unnoticed due to methodological 
shortcomings. This may explain why patients showing hemiplegia may need longer assistance 
after discharge from rehabilitation, as some of them may be unable to adopt safety measures 
(Hartman, Soroker, & Katz, 2001). 
Another significant outcome of the present study is the weak hemispheric asymmetry of 
anosognosia. Despite unawareness was numerically more frequent and on average more severe 
amongst RBD patients than LBD patients, the difference between the two groups was not 
significant, suggesting that lack of awareness for right hemiplegia may not be a negligible 
factor. While there is a general agreement on the association between anosognosia and right-
hemisphere damage (for recent reviews see Pia, Neppi-Modona, Ricci, & Berti, 2004; Orfei et 
al., 2007;  Heilman, 2014; Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014; see also Table 1), the relationship between 
awareness and left hemisphere is more debatable (Morin, 2007; 2017). Investigations of 
anosognosia for hemiplegia following damages of the dominant hemisphere are scant (see e.g., 
Nurmi & Jehkonen, 2014 Table 4) and some authors consider anosognosia for right hemiplegia 
a rare occurrence that can be observed only in very specific circumstances (e.g., Baier et al., 
Cocchini et al.  Unawareness and distorted perception of task difficulty 
 
16 
 
2014). However, recent studies have reported a less sporadic occurrence of anosognosia 
following damage of the left hemisphere (Hibbard, Stein, Gordon, & Sliwinski, 1992; Grotta 
& Bratina, 1995; Hartman-Maier et al., 2001; Hartman-Maier, Soroker, Ring, & Katz, 2002; 
Hartman-Maier, Soroker, Oman, & Katz, 2003; Appelros, Karlsson, Seiger, & Nydevik, 2007; 
Cocchini, Beschin, Cameron, Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2009). For example, Hartman-Maier 
and colleagues (2003) reported that anosognosia at admission was present in 53% of right- and 
up to 41% of left-brain damaged patients. The authors reported similar pattern of results in 
chronic phases where anosognosia was observed on 27% right- and 23% left-brain damaged 
patients. Appelros et al. (2007) examined anosognosia in a large sample of brain damaged 
patients and reported non-significant hemispheric difference for anosognosia with ‘only’ 54% 
of the 46 anosognosic patients suffering right-brain lesion. It is possible that presence and 
frequency of anosognosia following LBD may be inflated to an inability to recognise or 
represent the correct action (Pazzaglia, Pizzamiglio, Pes, & Aglioti, 2008). However, in our 
final analyses we only considered patients who provided correct responses to all the check 
questions, suggesting that these patients had an appropriate understanding of the task and were 
able to correctly recognise the target actions.  
Outcomes from studies with intra-carotid sodium amobarbital procedure (Wada Test) are 
also far from conclusive about the relationship between left hemisphere and awareness. Nearly 
all of these studies showed a higher frequency of anosognosia for left hemiplegia, which ranged 
between 66% (Dywan, McGlone, & Fox, 1995) to 100% (Gilmore, Heilman, Schmidt, Fennell, 
& Quisling, 1995); however in these same studies the frequency of anosognosia for right 
hemiplegia ranged from 0% to 86% (Gilmore et al., 1995; Carpenter et al., 1995; Buchtel, 
Henry, & Abpu-Khalil, 1992; Kaplan, Meadows, Cohen, Bromfield, & Ehrenberg, 1993; 
Dywan et al., 1995; Durkin, Meador, Nichols, Lee, & Loring, 1995; Lu et al., 1997) and the 
difference between the two hemisphere conditions could also range from 0% (Dywan et al., 
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1995) and 100% (Gilmore et al., 1995; for a revision see Cocchini & Della Sala, 2010 Table 
7.2).  
It seems therefore that, despite anosognosia for motor impairment is more frequently 
associated to a lesion (or anaesthetisation) of the right hemisphere, unawareness for right motor 
impairment is not a negligible phenomenon as commonly thought, though it may be less easily 
detectable. 
The debate about hemispheric asymmetry of anosognosia may denote some contradictions 
possibly generated, as suggested by Baier et al. (2014), by different researcher’s concept of 
anosognosia and consequently different selection of patients and methods, leading to 
investigations of potentially different underlying mechanisms (see also Morin, 2017; Jenkinson 
et al., 2011). The strong link between right brain damage and relatively rare severe cases of 
anosognosia characterised by an explicit and vehement denial of complete hemiplegia may 
represent a specific form of anosognosia, associated to lesions to particular brain areas (i.e.,  
right insula - Vocat, Staub, Stroppini, & Vuilleumier, 2010; Karnath , Baier, Nägele, 2005; 
Baier & Karnath, 2008; right premotor cortex - Berti et al., 2005; wide cortical and subcortical 
network -Moro et al., 2016) or on the presence of associated “right brain damage deficits” (e.g., 
unilateral spatial neglect; Feinberg, 1997; Vocat et al., 2010; Cocchini, Beschin, & Della Sala, 
2002) that render difficult the discovery of hemiplegia for the unattended limb/s. It should be 
noted that 26% of our LBD patients showed some degree of personal neglect; however up to 
52% of RBD patients showed the same deficit; therefore the merely presence of neglect cannot 
account for the hemispheric asymmetry for anosognosia.  
It must, however, be considered that a growing number of studies (e.g., Ramachandran, 
1995; Marcel et al., 2004; Nardone et al., 2007; Cocchini et al., 2010; Fotopoulou et al., 2010; 
Preston, Jenkinson, & Newport, 2010; Moro et al., 2011; Garbarini et al., 2012; Prigatano, 
2014) have demonstrated that anosognosia reveals itself in different domains and contexts, 
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showing different clinical correlates. Therefore, the use of different, more specific 
methodologies may enable researchers and clinicians to identify less apparent manifestations 
of anosognosia, like lack of awareness in patients showing different degrees of anosognosia 
and anosognosia for different degrees of motor impairment.  
A further observation concerns the ‘similar performance’ (scores) observed between 
anosognosic patients and healthy volunteers during the Current condition. Patients unaware of 
their motor impairment perceived the difficulty of the tasks similarly to healthy volunteers, as 
if they could still use both hands. These findings are in line with previous studies reporting a 
preserved motor planning in anosognosic patients, which was equivalent to healthy volunteers 
(e.g., Garbarini et al., 2012). Moreover, the anosognosic patients’ ability to perceive the 
complexity of each task per se is not altered. Therefore, the anosognosic patients’ ability to 
perceive the complexity of each task per se is not altered; however, they failed to take into 
account their motor impairments. This does not necessarily imply that the cause for 
anosognosia in all our patients can be easily traced back to a single mechanism. On the contrary, 
a sizable sample of 19 patients showed different performance on the two tests. Regardless of 
the rather speculative interpretation of single cases, it seems that lack of awareness can be 
caused by different reasons and the related manifestations may not be equally evident to a 
unique assessment method. This would be in line with the idea that anosognosia is a 
multifaceted syndrome (Prigatano, 2014) and may explain the relatively low, though 
significant, correlations between the Errand Choice Test and the VATAm. Overall suggesting 
that the use of a battery of tests rather than single measure of anosognosia may lead to a more 
detailed picture.  
To conclude, evidence of anosognosia has been associated with poor rehabilitation 
outcome (Gialanella & Mattioli, 1992;  Maeshima et al., 1997; Hartman-Maeir et al., 2002; 
Appelros et al., 2002; Gialanella, Monguzzi, Santoro, & Rocchi, 2005; di Legge, Fang, 
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Saposnik, & Hachinski, 2005) and increment of the risk of falls and a greater exposure to 
dangerous behaviours (Hartman-Maeir et al., 2001; Mograbi & Morris, 2013; Palmer & David, 
2013; Starkstein, Jorge, Mizrahi, Adrian, & Robinson, 2007; D’Imperio et al., 2017). These 
risks may be even greater for those patients who show a false awareness of their abilities by 
explicitly acknowledging their motor impairment but still misjudging the difficulty of bi-
manual tasks. These patients may possess a false sense of awareness of their own motor 
limitations, making them more prone to potentially risky situations.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 For meta-analyses purposes, the clinical group partially overlaps with the groups described 
in Cocchini et al., 2010 and Dean et al., 2017 
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Figures captions 
 
Figure 1. Examples of experimental items (a) and check items (b) 
 
Figure 2. LBD performance on the Errand Choice Test 
 
Figure 3. RBD performance on the Errand Choice Test 
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Figure 1. Examples of experimental items (a) and check items (b) 
In your current situation, which task would be easier for you? 
 
  a)                                                                  
            
 
                   Comb your hair                                 Fold a sheet in half 
 
  b) 
                              
 
                Rip a plant with roots                               Drink from a glass  
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Figure 2. LBD performance on the Choice Task Test. 
 
Dashed line indicates cut-off. Darker bars indicate pathological performance with score 
reported. 
Patient 57 was excluded for failing check questions. 
V: Patient performing below cut-off on the Errand Choice Test who did not show lack of 
awareness (i.e. score = -7.5) on the VATAm (V). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. RBD performance on the Choice Task Test. 
 
Dashed line indicates cut-off. Darker bars indicate pathological performance with score 
reported. 
Patient 20 was excluded for failing check questions. 
V: Patient performing below cut-off on the Errand Choice Test who did not show lack of 
awareness on the VATAm (V). Patients: 2, 3 and 14 obtained a score of -2, 1 and 0, 
respectively. 
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Table 3. Percentages of patients showing pathological performance on tasks assessing 
contralesional neglect, reasoning abilities and memory processing 
     
 
Extrapersonal neglect Personal Neglect Reasoning Short-term memory 
LBD 
33%  (7% - 13% - 13%) 26%  (13% - 10% - 3%) 20% 0% 
RBD 
40%  ( 9% -  5% - 26%) 52%  (26% - 19% - 7%) 33% 19% 
     
In brackets, percentages of patients showing evidence of neglect on one, two or all three tests 
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   Table 4. Percentages of uni-manual choices made by the controls in the Current and 
Simulated conditions. 
 
 
CURRENT 
CONDITION 
SIMULATED 
CONDITION 
SIMULATED  
minus 
CURRENT 
  (%) (%) (%) 
 Face in hands - Fingers through hairs 70 95 25 
 Brush hairs - Tie a ribbon 84 100 16 
 Money in money box – Put on jumper 81 100 19 
 Peel watermelon - Prune small plant 66 91 25 
 Carry bucket of water – Wearing t-shirt 18 95 77 
 Draw line with ruler - Write 68 95 27 
 Eat ice-cream - Cut a steak 74 97 23 
 Put pot on - put small pan on 92 98 6 
 Fold sheet - Comb hairs 53 92 39 
 Clapping - Rub nose 53 98 45 
 Put on lipstick - Put on toothpaste 58 92 34 
 Pick up daisy - Put on gloves 88 100 13 
 Hold ball in hands - Ring a door bell 78 100 22 
 Turn sausages - Fasten necklace 89 100 11 
 Switch on TV - Raise a 2-handle tray 89 98 9 
 Cut sheet with scissors - Pick a card  86 100 14 
 
  
Total condition 
discrepancy score 
Condition 
405 
                          Uni-manual tasks are underlined 
 
  
Cocchini et al.  Unawareness and distorted perception of task difficulty 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
